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How International Law Can Save The
African Elephant
Jacob Templer*
The substantial decline of the African elephant population over
the last few centuries has resulted in regionally distinct challenges
for the different sub-Saharan regions of Africa. Across the
continent, the most significant short-term threat to African
elephant survival is poaching and the illegal trade it sustains.
Furthermore, the greatest long-term threat these creatures face is
habitat and range area loss. The Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
(“CITES”), is an international agreement between governments
charged with management of the trade in endangered species.
CITES has contributed to the major threats that encumber African
elephant survival by its creation of the legal ivory market, and its
structure that neglects the management of African elephants as a
transboundary species. This article’s proposed solutions to ensure
the survival of the African elephant are to: eliminate the legal
ivory market and increase the incorporation of transboundary
conservation practices in CITES elephant management.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, I had the privilege to volunteer for the African Elephant
Research Unit of Knysna Elephant Park in Knysna, South Africa. Each
morning I would eagerly rise and rush to the common room to watch the
sun rise over the Outeniqua mountains, exposing the giants I had come
halfway around the world for. The park has rescued and relocated
elephants in need since its inception in 1994, brought on by the decision
of wildlife management to cull elephant herds as a means of crude
population control.1 The Knysna forest of the Western Cape that surrounds
the park was historically the southernmost point where one could find wild
African elephants.2 While the forest was once home to over a thousand
elephants, its last inhabitant, a lone female named Oupoot, serves as a
symbol of the greater fight for survival elephants face across the continent
today.3 Only a few thousand years ago, the African elephant’s range
extended nearly five-thousand miles from the Cape to the Mediterranean.4
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (“CITES”), a multilateral environmental agreement
1

KNYSNA ELEPHANT PARK, https://knysnaelephantpark.co.za (last visited Oct. 30,
2020).
2
Heather Dugmore, The Last Knysna Elephant Has A Message For People,
BUSINESSDAY (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/life/2019-02-06-the-lastknysna-elephant-has-a-message-for-people/
3
Riaan Grobler, Meet Oupoot, the only elephant left in the entire Knysna forest,
NEWS24 (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/meet-oupoot-theonly-elephant-left-in-the-entire-knysna-forest-20190215.
4
African
Elephants,
WORLD
WILDLIFE
FUND,
https://wwf.panda.org/discover/knowledge_hub/endangered_species/elephants/african_el
ephants/? (last visited, Sept. 8, 2020).
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among 183 nations, effectively controls the fate of endangered species
today.5 CITES’ aim, to ensure that the trade in endangered species does
not threaten their survival, should require its parties to address the
challenges that threaten the survival of both African elephant species: the
savannah and forest elephant.6 This article explores CITES’ ability to
address both the short- and long- term threats to the survival of the African
elephant. How humanity chooses to care for the fabled African elephant
speaks bounds about our relationship with the natural world, one that we
depend on for our survival. With nearly one million animal and plant
species at risk of extinction, biodiversity loss around the world grows at
unprecedented rates.7 Saving the African elephant does more than just
preserve one of the most magnificent creatures on Earth: it allows the
largest animal on Earth to show that international cooperation and
innovation can produce effective conservation on a continental scale.
Part II of this article presents the historical relationship between
humans and elephants from ancient times to the modern crisis. Part III
examines the short- and long-term threats that face African elephants,
along with their prospective solutions. Part IV exposes recent CITES
proposals as emblematic of the underlying elephant conservation issues
they mask. Part V concludes that CITES’ approach to the short- and longterm threats that face African elephants is antithetical to their survival,
however it recognizes the enormous opportunity for elephants and humans
alike to adjust course and preserve the species.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMANS AND ELEPHANTS
Humans and elephants share a long history beginning with our
ancestor, homo erectus, dating back to approximately 1.8 million years
ago.8 Excavations of stone tools in northeast Tanzania found alongside the
bones of an ancient elephant species revealed the human reliance on
elephants as an ancient food source.9 Human’s evolution into a smaller,
5

What is CITES?, CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD
FAUNA AND FLORA, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
6
Summary for policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services, INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCIENCE-POLICY PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY
AND
ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES
[IPBES]
at
12
(Nov.
26,
2019),
https://ipbes.net/sites/default/files/202002/ipbes_global_assessment_report_summary_for_policymakers_en.pdf.
7
Raman Sukumar, Conflict, Negotiation and Coexistence: Rethinking HumanElephant Relations in South Asia 31-46 (Piers Locke & Jane Buckingham eds., 1st ed.
2016).
8
Id. at 40.
9
Doran H. Ross, Elephant the Animal and Its Ivory in African Culture, 25 Afr. Arts 65,
66 (1992).
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more agile species, coincides with the extinction of some elephant species,
which is suggestive of the impact elephants had as a food source.10
Archaeological findings indicate that many African cultures incorporated
elephant imagery into different forms of their oral literature.11 Elephant
imagery in African culture varied in use from secular to spiritual. One
example is the Kongo tribe in present day Democratic Republic of Congo,
which adorned antelope horns with elephants carvings to summon
ancestral spirits.12 In 3,000 BC, the first records of tamed African
elephants came from the First Dynasty Egyptian hieroglyphics, which
depicted separate symbols for wild and domestic elephants (the latter
included a human rider).13 The most famous tame African elephants in
history were those of Hannibal’s Carthaginian army that climbed through
the Italian Alps in 218 BC.14
The advent of European exploration and later colonization of Africa
brought with it a terrible fate for elephants throughout the continent. In
1800, the estimated population of African elephants roaming the continent
was 26 million.15 The late nineteenth century witnessed a European
demand for products made from elephant tusks (i.e. ivory) that included
items such as pool balls, piano keys, and brush handles.16 This exploitation
was enabled by the creation and distribution of large caliber elephant guns,
marking the transition from historically subsistence hunting to hunting for
ivory and trophy hunting.17 By 1913, the total population of African
elephants was reduced to ten million. At that time, the United States
consumed 200 tons of ivory a year.18 The ivory trade to Europe and
America in the nineteenth century served as a prelude to the legal and
illegal trade that occurs today.19
As the twentieth century rolled on, elephants were cast in a new light.
In 1930, Jean de Brunhoff wrote the first of fifty stories that detailed the
adventures of the fictional elephant, Babar, which inspired other
depictions of fictional elephants like Dr. Seuss’s “Horton” and Disney’s

10

Sukumar, supra note 7, at 32.
Ross, supra note 9, at 65.
12
Id. at 70.
13
Id. at 68.
14
Elaine Larson, The History of the Ivory Trade, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 25, 2013),
https://www.nationalgeaographic.org/media/history-ivory-trade.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Martha Chaiklin, Early Modern Trade in Context: Ivory in World History, 8 HISTORY
COMPASS
530, 539 (2010); see also Ross, supra note 9, at 67.
18
Larson, supra note 14.
19
See id.
11

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

191

“Dumbo.”20 Despite the newly won fictional affinity, elephant populations
would receive no reprieve. Widespread bush wars that followed the
decolonization of Africa contributed to a substantial increase in elephants
poached for ivory, with estimates of about 250 elephants killed a day in
the 1950s.21 In the 1960s, an increased global interest in the conservation
of endangered animals lead to the convention of eighty nations in
Washington, D.C. that ultimately signed CITES in 1973.22 The mission of
CITES remains “to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild
animals and plants does not threaten their survival.”23
By 1979 the global demand for ivory had depleted the African
elephant population to 1.3 million.24 In 1988, the decade-long attempt to
regulate a legal commercial trade in African elephant ivory by CITES
proved to be unsuccessful as the population reduced to a meager
600,000.25 The United States Congress banned the importation of African
elephant ivory for commercial purposes in 1988 when it passed the African
Elephant Conservation Act.26 In January 1990, CITES placed a total ban
on the international trade in ivory with an upgrade of the protection status
of African elephants globally to the highest level available under the
treaty.27
However, in 1997 and 2000, CITES downgraded the protection status
of the elephant populations in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe, which permitted limited commercial trade in ivory and other
elephant products.28 After the parties to CITES approved the sale of those
government’s registered ivory stocks to China and Japan in 2008, the legal
ivory trade reignited the parallel illegal ivory trade.29 As of 2016, the
African elephant population is estimated to be 415,000, a ninety percent
decrease in just over one-hundred years.30

20

Bianca Sánchez, The Complicated History of the Human and Elephant Relationship,
SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonianinstitution/complicated-history-human-and-elephant-relationship-180970858/
21
Larson, supra note 14.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Elephant Ivory Trade-Relaed Timeline with Relevance to the United States, HUMANE
SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL (last visited Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.hsi.org/wpcontent/uploads/assets/pdfs/Elephant_Related_Trade_Timeline.pdf.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id; see also Solomon Hsiang and Nitin Sekar, Does Legalization Reduce Black Market
Activity? Evidence from a Global Ivory Experiment and Elephant Poaching Data,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 17, https://www.nber.org/papers/w22314.
29
Id.
30
The status of African elephants, WORLD WILDLIFE MAGAZINE (2018),
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III. CITES & THREATS TO ELEPHANT SURVIVAL
Today, CITES’ regulation of the trade in endangered species affords
its parties the opportunity to affect policies that sustain effective elephant
conservation. CITES’ facilitation of the legal ivory trade is made possible
by the split-listing31 of African elephant populations in different countries.
Meanwhile, the continued use of a system that fails to account for the
inherent weakness in management of Africa’s elephants on a country-bycountry basis has threatened the African elephant with extinction. These
two issues substantially contribute to the short- and long- term threats to
elephant survival. However, the parties to CITES are simultaneously
poised to correct their issues and accomplish a remarkable feat for
elephants: save a species that still occupies a large expanse of its historic
range and thereby preserve the crucial role elephants serve as a creator of
the ecosystems they inhabit. Without concerted action against the threats
that face the African elephant, their future will likely be relegated to small,
fragmented population pockets. Elephants have viable options that could
reroute their fate.
CITES’ aim as an international agreement is, through ratification, to
legally bind parties to adopt national legislation that comports with the
regulations imposed on endangered species by CITES.32 One such
example is a Declaration of Prohibited Exports by the Director of the
Kenya Wildlife Service, under the Wildlife Conservation and
Management Act, that bans the export of elephant ivory.33 The basic
structure of CITES requires all import, export, and re-export of species to
be authorized by a licensing system managed by a party’s domestic
management authority, and requires each party to have a scientific
authority advise them on the possible trade effects felt by the species.34
Many parties operate their management and scientific authorities within

https://www.worldwildlife.org/magazine/issues/winter-2018/articles/the-status-ofafrican-elephants.
31
Split-listing is when a species’ population is in on different Appendices depending on
which
Country the species is in i.e. an elephant in Zambia is in Appendix I, until it walks across
the
border to Zimbabwe, then it enters Appendix II.
32
What is CITES?, supra note 5
33
THE
LAWS
OF
KENYA,
REVISED
EDITION
(2012),
http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/WildlifeConservationandManageme
ntActCap376_2_.pdf
34
What is CITES?, supra note 5.
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the same entity, such as Botswana’s Department of Wildlife and National
Parks.35
CITES uses three Appendices to designate the level of species
protection.36 Appendix I is the highest level of protection for species
threatened by extinction, with trade permitted only in exceptional
circumstances.37 Appendix II includes species not threatened by
extinction, but nonetheless afforded controls on their trade to prevent
adverse effects on their survival.38 Appendix III protects a species in at
least one country that seeks assistance in management of that species’
trade internationally.39 The original 1973 text provides criteria to
determine which Appendices a species should belong in, along with
Resolution Conf. 9.24 Criteria for Amendment of Appendices I and II
(“Conf. 9.24”) that provides additional considerations to determine
whether a species should be in Appendices I or II.40 Some factors
considered to determine if a species qualifies for Appendix I include a
decline in habitat area and quality, number of individuals, and area of
distribution.41 The added criteria also emphasizes that species should not
be split-listed under different Appendices given the added enforcement
challenges it presents.42

a.

Short- Term Threat to Survival

The short-term threat to the African elephants’ survival is poaching
and illegal trade.43 With over 100,000 elephants dead as a result of
poaching since 2007, the continental population estimate is 415,000.44 The
rate of poaching varies between the four different regions elephants
inhabit: African elephant’s ranges commonly extend across national
35

Botswana - National Authorities, CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED
SPECIES, https://www.cites.org/eng/parties/country-profiles/bw/national-authorities (last
visited Oct. 30, 2020).
36
What is CITES?, supra note 5.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Criteria for amendment of Appendices I and II (Resolution Conf. 9.24), CONVENTION
INTL.
TRADE
IN
ENDANGERED
SPECIES
2
(1994),
ON
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-09-24-R17.pdf [hereinafter 9.24].
41
Id. at 4.
42

Id. at 5.
C.R. Thouless et al., African Elephant Status Report 2016: An update from the African
Elephant Database, INTL. UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE (2016),
http://savetheelephants.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2016-AfESG-African-ElephantStatus-Report.pdf.
44
Id.
43
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borders,45 which makes CITES’ structural design that manages national
populations independently of one another ill-suited to continental survival.
An understanding of the unique situation each of the four regions
experiences provides context for the interrelated nature of elephant
conservation and how policy in one region affects the others.
West Africa’s elephant population is the smallest and comprises about
three percent of the continental population with approximately 12,000.
This region experienced extensive poaching in the 19th century.46 The vast
majority of West Africa’s elephant population is concentrated in the W
Transborder Park shared among Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger, with the
remaining populations highly fragmented and isolated.47 Since 2007, local
populations have been exterminated in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Togo.48 West Africa hosts the
largest illegal ivory transport hub on the west coast, one of the two largest
on the continent, in Nigeria.49 As West Africa’s elephant population
diminishes further, poachers will have to concentrate their efforts in the
regions that still contain higher populations.
Central Africa has experienced severe poaching since 2003, with sixty
percent of its elephant population killed between 2002 and 2011.50
Notably, accurate population surveys are nearly impossible given the
Congo Rainforest’s impenetrable vegetation cover, and decades of
significant and pervasive armed conflict in the region.51 With speculation
that there may be up to 100,000 unaccounted for elephants, there is great
uncertainty surrounding the estimated population of 25,000.52 Central
Africa is the home of the lesser known African elephant subspecies, the
African forest elephant; the majority of their population is isolated to
45

Keith Lindsay, The shared nature of Africa’s elephants, 215 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION
260, 261 (2017).
46
Elephants In The Dust The - African Elephant Crisis, UNEP, CITES, IUCN, and
TRAFFIC, at 23 (2013), http://africanelephantdatabase.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2020)
[hereinafter UNEP].
47
Thouless et al., supra note 43, at 10.
48
Id.
49
CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA
[CITES], Report on the Elephant Trade Information System, 14 (Working Paper, CoP18
Doc. 69.3) (2019) https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/18/doc/E-CoP18-069-03.pdf
[hereinafter ETIS].
50
CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA
[CITES], Report on Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants, 9, CoP18 Doc. 69.2,
(2019) https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/index.php [hereinafter MIKE].
51
Stephen Blake, et al., Forest Elephant Crisis in the Congo Basin, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY
945, 951
(2007); see also Thouless et al., supra note 43.
52
Thouless et al., supra note 43.
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Gabon and Congo.53 The legal ivory trade of the four Southern African
nation’s populations has an incalculable toll on Central Africa’s uncertain
population.
East Africa has experienced the most poaching of all regions in recent
years, with nearly 87,000 elephants or 50% of their population lost since
2007.54 Improved enforcement and management has stymied a local
eradication of the 86,000 elephants left, which comprise nearly twenty
percent of the continental population.55
The legal trade permitted by the split-listing of elephants in Southern
Africa into lower protection status than their counterparts undermines the
security of populations in West, Central, and East Africa, as those
population’s poached ivory is invariably smuggled into the legal ivory
market.56 Southern Africa holds over seventy percent of the continental
population at 294,000, seventy-five percent of them found in the KavangoZambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area: a 200,000 square mile crossborder conservation area shared among Angola, Botswana, Namibia,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.57 Southern Africa contains the largest illegal
ivory transport hub on the east coast in Mozambique, a country rife with
corruption that enables poaching and illegal trade to flourish.58 In recent
years, Southern Africa has seen the emergence of a growing poaching
threat.59

53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Blake et al., supra note 51, at 951.
Thouless et al., supra note 43, at 8.
Id.
See Hsiang & Sekar, supra note 28, at 3.
Id. at 9.
ETIS, supra note 49, at 14, 18.
Hsiang & Sekar, supra note 28, at 3.
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The purple boundaries distinguish the regions of Africa: North, West,
Central, East, Southern.

b.

Short- Term Solution

Through CITES, the international community could curtail poaching
and reduce the illegal trade by promulgating an amendment that extends
Appendix I status to all African elephants. Under CITES’ criteria,
Appendix I is to include “species threatened with extinction that are or
may be affected by trade,” while Appendix II is intended to include
“[species] not necessarily threatened with extinction.”60 The crucial
difference is Appendix II status permits commercial trade, while Appendix
I status prohibits it. While the threats that face African elephants are agreed
upon throughout the scientific community, the central disagreement
among CITES parties revolves around whether the legal trade in ivory has
negatively impacted poaching and the illegal trade. The legal ivory trade

60

CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA,
Convention text, 1 (Mar. 3, 1973), https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php.
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today is derived from the ivory sold in past government stockpile
selloffs.61
While all African elephants were in Appendix II between 1977 and
1989, the total population decreased from about 1.3 million to 600,000. In
1989, CITES moved all African elephant populations to Appendix I,
where they remained until the populations of Botswana, Namibia, South
Africa, and Zimbabwe moved back to Appendix II in 1997 and 2000.
Those four countries claimed the elephant populations in their countries
were large enough that their survival would not be threatened by the legal
trade.62 The result was the creation of the modern-day legal ivory market.63
Appendix II status allows trade in hunting trophies, live animals, other
elephant derived products, but most significantly – trade in government
registered raw ivory stocks.64
The first legal sale of raw ivory stocks occurred in 1999 when a total
of 49,574 kilograms of ivory were sold from Botswana, Namibia, and
Zimbabwe to Japan.65 However, with no poaching data being collected at
the time, a connection between the sale’s effect on poaching and the illegal
market is indeterminable.66 A second sale occurred in 2008 with the
addition of South Africa as a supplier and China as a buyer .67 This time,
CITES’ new programs started in 2002, Monitoring the Illegal Killing of
Elephants, (“MIKE”), and the Elephant Trade Information System,
(“ETIS”), enabled a connection to be drawn between the legal sale and its
effect on poaching and the illegal trade.68
MIKE was created to provide information to parties that enables
informed management and enforcement decisions.69 MIKE’s objectives
are to: record levels and trends of poaching in elephant range states, assess
CITES’ decisions effects on elephant poaching and the illegal trade,
provide an information pool to execute appropriate management and
enforcement decisions, and build an institutional capacity that enables
range states to manage their elephant populations long term.70 MIKE
evaluates relative poaching levels based on the Proportion of Illegally
61

Id.
Id.
63
Id. at 4.
64
Id.
65
Buyers of Elephant Ivory, POACHING FACTS: TRUTHS FROM THE FRONTLINES,
http://www.poachingfacts.com/faces-of-the-poachers/buyers-of-elephant-ivory/
66
Id.
67
See generally id. China was then the largest global importer of illegal ivory; today, it
is Vietnam.
68
See id.
69
CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA
(CITES), https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/index.php, last visited (Jan. 1, 2020).
70
Id.
62
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Killed Elephants, (“PIKE”), with scores above 0.50 indicative of elephant
populations in net decline.71 The ETIS program tracks and records the
illegal trade in ivory and other elephant products, and provides analyses of
levels and trends in the illegal trade.72 ETIS records contain elephant
specimen seizures that have occurred globally since 1989.73
A notable discontinuous increase in the poaching and illegal trade of
African elephant ivory followed the 2008 sale.74 In 2019, the Hsiang study
analyzed the 2008 legal sale’s net effect on the illegal market.75 The study
revealed that the legal market served as a conduit for smuggler’s to infuse
illegal ivory into the legal market, increased the cost of law enforcement,
and lowered the cost of the illegal ivory as the risk of arrest decreased.76
Despite the introduction of the legal market, the illegal market demand
increased as new consumers were attracted by the reduced stigma of being
caught or involved in an illegal trade, further complicated by the fact that
consumers are generally unable to tell the difference between legal and
illegal ivory.77 In Hong Kong, one of the world’s largest ivory markets, it
is well known that ivory acquired before the 1989 ban, which is
permissible to sell, is regularly replenished with ivory derived from
poaching and the illegal trade.78
Data analysis in the Hsiang study included MIKE and ETIS data from
between 1996 and 2013.79 The data revealed a thirty-eight percent increase
in the proportion of illegally killed elephants, a sixty-six percent increase
in poaching rates, and a seventy-one percent increase in illegal smuggling
out of Africa, all of which coincided with the 2008 legal sale.80 The study
supported the theory that the 2008 legal ivory sale caused an “abrupt,
significant, permanent, robust, and geographically widespread increase”
in poaching and illegal smuggling.81 Further support for this conclusion
can be found in the continued existence of the Hong Kong ivory market.82

71

Id.
CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA,
The Elephant Trade Information System, https://cites.org/eng/prog/etis/index.php, (last
visited Jan. 1, 2020).
73
Id.
74
See Hsiang & Sekar, supra note 28, at 21-22.
75
See id. at 11.
76
See id. at 7.
77
Id.
78
See Peter Knights et al., The Illusion of Control: Hong Kong’s ‘Legal’ Ivory Trade,
WILDAID, 4 (2015).
79
Hsiang & Sekar, supra note 28, at 10.
80
Id. at 15, 27.
81
Id. at 30.
82
See Knights et al., supra note 78, at 9.
72
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Before the ivory trade was banned in 1989, the British government
exercised a reservation in CITES that allowed what was then the colony
of Hong Kong to continue to sell the ivory already in its possession.83 The
initial 670 tons of ivory in Hong Kong then became 474 tons, with wide
suspicions that nearly 200 tons were smuggled into Japan; of the initial
670 tons, 570 tons were found to have originated from illegally sourced
poaching.84
Importantly, alternative theories for the increase in poaching and
illegal trade were ruled out: the 2008 financial crisis, an abrupt increase in
purchase of valuable raw materials, an abrupt increase of poaching in other
slow-breeding species (rhinoceros, tiger, leopard), a notable increase in
Chinese GDP, or the financial investment and physical presence in African
elephant range states.85 None of these alternative theories saw an increase
consistent with the 2008 sale that would explain them as the cause of, or a
significant factor towards, the increase in poaching and illegal
smuggling.86 While CITES dedicates an entire section of MIKE reports
towards assessment of CITES’ decisions effects on poaching, their
position is that no evidence exists that suggests the 2008 sale affected
poaching and illegal smuggling in any way.87 Furthermore, pre-1989 ivory
should have been sold-off entirely by 2004 if Hong Kong’s sales records
are to be taken as accurate.88 Those records, along with statements made
by ivory vendors in Hong Kong attesting to the ease in which illegal ivory
replaces pre-1989 stocks, are direct evidence of the legal ivory market’s
impact on poaching and the illegal trade.89
Inclusion of all African elephant populations in Appendix I will ban
the legal trade in elephant ivory. The data supports the conclusion that a
ban on the legal trade in ivory would drastically reduce poaching and
illegal trade, the most significant short- term threat to the survival of the
African elephant.

c.

Long- Term Threat to Survival

The long-term threat to African elephant survival is habitat and range
area loss.90 African elephant range includes diverse ecosystems of desert,
forest, jungle, savannah, and swamp.91 Between 1995 and 2007, elephant
83
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range area in Africa decreased by about forty-two percent.92 With more
than half of global population growth projected to occur in Africa by 2050,
encroachment is not poised to slow down.93 One of the largest foreign
investors in Africa is China, with sixty billion dollars pledged in 2018.94
Chinese exploitation of natural resources, coupled with their enormous
role in the illegal ivory trade, leaves them in a powerful position regarding
the future of elephant conservation in Africa.95 One of Africa’s largest
investors is also one of its most prolific natural resource exploiters.
In 2013, uncertainty surrounded whether the elephant populations of
Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan would survive; however, in 2016 it was
confirmed all three countries no longer possess resident elephant herds.96
Without a concerted effort to preserve the African elephant habitat, their
fate may resemble that of the Sumatran elephant. The lowland forests of
Southeast Asia experienced a seventy percent deforestation rate within
twenty-five years.97 With a major part of their habitat lost, the critically
endangered Sumatran elephant’s population is now less than 2,800.98 The
Sumatran elephant serves as an example of the potential future of the
African elephant species if their habitat is not secured for generations to
come.

d.
Long-Term Solution: Connectivity and Transboundary
Regulation
In 1990, Michael Glennon proposed that the CITES parties should
treat their duty to protect their endangered species as erga omnes,99 and
make the species’ protection a priority over individual parties’ usage of
species for their own economic gain.100 Glennon envisioned that protection
91
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of endangered species as erga omnes would enable legal causes of action
to be brought against parties for failure to protect their endangered species
as parties of CITES.101 Despite his proposal, CITES parties began to assert
the United Nations Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, “to prevent the exploitation of resources in developing
countries by neocolonial interests,” as a means for them to profit off their
natural resources – including elephants.102
The problem with CITES parties’ application of this principle is that
it fosters inconsistent elephant protection policy in different countries that
neighbor each other. The majority of African elephants’ range area extends
across national borders;103 a treaty framework that distinguishes protection
afforded to a species based on which country the species is in at any given
time is antithetical to the nature of elephants as a species. Continued
practice within CITES that permits parties to assert a sovereign right of
determinism over their elephants places the continent’s interdependent
population at increased risk. If CITES parties would forego their ability to
exercise reservations in treaty proceedings regarding their national
elephant populations, and embrace fundamental principles of
transboundary conservation, it would reward parties with sustainable,
long- term economic and environmental security.
With seventy-six percent of the African elephant population found
spread across national borders, CITES incorporation of transboundary
conservation is better suited to their survival.104 Transboundary
conservation achieves conservation goals across one or more national
boundaries.105 As a part of its Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines
series, the International Union for Conservation of Nature provides a
comprehensive and integrated guide for transboundary conservation.106
The guide is essentially a “how to” model for transboundary conservation
that includes: history, key concepts, viability, operation principles,
implementation, and capacity building.107 The potential benefits of
transboundary conservation span legal and policy frameworks, ecosystem
management, climate change responses, and socio-economics.108 CITES
Evolving Treaties, and Empty Threats, 19 J. OF INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2016);
citing
Michael Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant? 84 AM. J. INT’L. 1 (1990).
101
Id. at 8.
102
Lindsay, supra note 45, at 267.
103
Id. at 260.
104
Id. at 263.
105
See Masa Vasilijevic et al., Transboundary Conservation: A systematic and integrated
approach, INTL. UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, xi (2013).
106
See id.
107
See id.

202 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:2

parties that invest in transboundary conservation plans are poised to
benefit from enhanced connectivity of conservation areas, protection of
migratory species, improved genetic diversity, increased opportunities for
cross-border eco-tourism and related enterprises, and management
collaboration that improves patrols and decreases operation costs.109
Habitat and range area loss are mitigated by the transboundary model
through maintenance and increase of connectivity between populations.110
Enhanced connectivity enables diffusive density-dependent dispersal that
reduces human-elephant conflict, increases engagement of elephants in
their roles as keystone species, and produces more reliable metapopulation data.111 Poaching in neighboring countries can prevent
elephants migratory patterns, and thus produce unnatural population
densities that increase the chances of human-elephant conflict (i.e. fighting
over water sources).112 Examples of elephant populations crossing borders
to replenish extinct local populations include movements from Uganda to
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and from South Africa to
Mozambique.113 Connectivity across national borders allows for more
natural elephant population densities, as elephants in overcrowded habitats
seek out less crowded habitats to live in.114
Connectivity is more important today than ever as seasonal food and
water variability increases with climate change.115 Increased connectivity
of elephant habitat promotes elephants engagement in their roles as seed
dispersers, that improves the quality of their habitat.116 Improvement in
elephant habitat and more balanced population densities would reduce
money spent by management authorities on water provision,
contraception, and population control.117 For example, increased
connectivity in drought ridden regions would permit elephants to migrate
towards alternative water sources rather than compete for water with local
human populations, and thereby require further resources to prevent the
resulting human-elephant conflict. Those resources would therefore be
available to meet other conservation needs, that may include increased
capacity for cross-border eco-tourism investment.
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If CITES replaces the parties’ ability to exercise reservations over
their national elephant management with an integrated cross-border
structure that manages elephants harmoniously across national borders,
issues such as habitat and biodiversity preservation, habitat connectivity,
and human-elephant conflict would be remedied and replaced with
increased sustainable long-term economic opportunities for local
communities.
Part of effective reform involves the national legislation in both range
states and those affected by the illegal ivory trade.118 A comprehensive
assessment of principal conservation legislation in numerous range states
in Africa revealed significant loopholes and variations on provincial
implementation of national laws, inadequate penalties, antiquated or
CITES’ contrary legislation, presence of limited prosecutorial power and
experience, and inadequate judicial procedure and capacity.119
Recommendations included increased updates and homogeneity of
domestic legislation, publication of prosecutorial statistics and judicial
opinions, education of local communities about the realities of poaching
and the illegal international trade, and the benefits that come with
expansion of eco-tourism.120
Sponsorship of initiatives that promote homogenous legislation across
national borders for violations of CITES’ elephant protections and
poaching are inherent in the transboundary conservation model. The Space
for Giants organization’s judicial reform initiative that provides
prosecutorial training to countries grappling with poaching is one example
of a critical resource that facilitates long- term improvement of domestic
prosecution and criminal justice.121
Protection of African elephant habitat extends to the African
continent’s many ecosystems. Elephants are a keystone species: those that
maintain significant linkages in the natural food web to the extent that their
extermination would cause a domino effect.122 In savannah ecosystems,
negligible elephant populations are marked by low plant variation, while
moderate elephant population density foster up to three times as much
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variety.123 Much of the African savannah was created as elephants cleared
dense bush and woodlands, allowing other species such as buffalo, gazelle,
and zebra to flourish.124 The cleared bush also helps cattle ranchers as it
provides access to otherwise inaccessible grazing land, and reduces tsetse
fly exposure.125 Forest elephants play an enormous role in formation of
ecosystems in Central and West Africa; they clear forest paths that open
up the canopy and allow light to reach the rainforest floor.126 These light
patches common to the Congo Rainforest sustain increased plant diversity,
and also create increased access pathways for other forest species such as
forest hog, antelope, and gorilla.127 Forest elephants are the most important
seed dispersers in the Congo Rainforest, they contribute to the movement
of at least ninety-six plant species in some locations.128 Local extinctions
have already suffered the ecological consequences that come with the loss
of a keystone species.129 Enactment of policies that protect elephant
habitat, and thereby elephants, also protect the vast and varied natural
ecosystems across the continent.
CITES’ substantial incorporation of transboundary conservation into
their institutional frameworks will promote increased quantity and quality
of the African elephant habitat, as the species is permitted to keep their
crucial role in the greater African ecosystem. As a species that mainly lives
across national borders, a management model that is reflective of their
nature is best suited to their sustained survival.

IV. SYMBOLS OF THE ISSUES: PROPOSALS TO CHANGE CITES
ELEPHANT POLICY
a.

Movement to Expand Appendix II

In 2019, Zambia submitted a proposal to reclassify elephants within
their borders under Appendix I at the Conference of the parties to
CITES.130 Zambia is located in Southern Africa, the region of Africa that
both contains the most elephants and has the only four parties (Botswana,
Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe) whose elephant populations are in
123
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Appendix II. Zambia amended their initial proposal by removal of their
sought after Appendix II permissible commercial ivory trade when they
were met with staunch opposition by other parties.131 Opposition to
Zambia’s initial proposal was made by Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, the
European Union, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and the
United States; these parties affirmed that a commercial sale of government
stockpile ivory may reignite the illegal trade.132 Zambia’s final proposal
was left with only the prospect of increased trade of some elephant hunting
trophies and other derived goods.133
In their proposal, Zambia noted that international trade is not a concern
for the population of elephants in Zambia, and that the need to move the
population to Appendix II arises from human-elephant conflict.134 Zambia
further noted its intention to benefit rural communities financially from
their ivory and trophy hunting proceeds.135 The CITES Secretariat agreed
with Zambia that their elephant populations no longer met Appendix I
criteria as set forth in Conf. 9.24.136 The parties voted to reject Zambia’s
proposal, causing elephants within their borders to remain classified
within Appendix I.137

i. Problem with Expansion of Appendix II
The human-elephant conflict and benefits to affected local
communities would have been made worse had Zambia’s initial proposal
been approved. Zambia’s proposal would have exacerbated humanelephant conflict by increasing poaching and the illegal trade. Increase of
the illegal trade would deprive local communities of elephants that could
contribute to their economic well-being through eco-tourism initiatives
possible in the transboundary conservation model.138
One such example of local communities directly benefiting from
management of their local elephants is the Reteti Elephant Sanctuary
operated by the Samburu tribe in Kenya, the first community owned
elephant orphanage in Africa.139 Human-elephant conflict is reduced with
transboundary conservation through cooperation that enables elephants to
131

Id.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
See Vasilijevic et al., supra note 105.
139
RETETI ELEPHANT SANCTUARY, https://www.retetielephants.org/who-we-are/ (last
visited Oct.
25, 2020).
132

206 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:2

have greater connectivity in their range area that produces less encounters
with humans.140 Human-elephant conflict reduction and increased benefits
for local communities will be forever fleeting without commitment from
CITES parties to transboundary conservation management of elephants.
CITES’ split-listing of elephant populations highlights the parties’
reluctance to embrace the transboundary conservation model. The criteria
for amendment of a species’ Appendices status recommends that splitlisting should be avoided for the enforcement problems it creates.141
Zambia’s elephant population is a part of the greater Kavango-Zambezi
Transfrontier Conservation Area that spans five countries and holds
seventy-five percent of Southern Africa’s elephant population.142 Despite
Zambia’s claims and the CITES Secretariat’s conclusion, their elephant
population meets the criteria for Appendix I. The third criteria of Conf.
9.24 is a marked decline in the wild population.143 Decline is defined as a
reduction in the number of individuals, habitat area, or area of distribution,
and can be expressed as long term or recent.144 Recent decline is
characterized by a fifty percent decline in the last seventy-five years.145
Zambia’s elephant population was approximately 200,000 in 1972 and
today stands at approximately 22,000 – a near ninety percent decline in
less than seventy-five years.146 As such, Zambia’s elephant population
undoubtedly satisfies the third criteria of Conf. 9.24 for Appendix I.
Further, Zambia’s claims that the illegal international trade in ivory is
not of concern for their elephant population is disingenuous. The 2016
African Elephant Status Report, (“AESR 2016”), reported the Zambian
elephant population had been severely affected by poaching.147
Zambia is one example of many elephant range states that experience
poor governance and corruption that prevent effective elephant
conservation and contribute to poaching and the illegal trade. Zambia
ranks in the bottom half of the 2018 Corruption Index and had three tons
of ivory disappear from a government storage facility perpetrated by
government game scouts in 2017.148 Zambia’s inability to maintain
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effective governance necessary for a legal trade has been further
undermined by its neighbors, with some of the worst records of elephant
poaching and involvement in the illegal trade. To the west, Angola ranks
165 out of 180 countries in the 2018 Corruption Index; and harbors a
significant presence of Vietnamese crime syndicates.149 To the east,
Mozambique ranks 158 out of 180 countries in the 2018 Corruption Index,
illustrated by a number of large thefts from government ivory
stockpiles.150 Mozambique is the largest illegal ivory trade base on the east
coast of Africa, with only Nigeria as a comparable operation in the west.151
And while Zambia should not be judged by the actions of their neighbors,
the reality that elephants do not know when they have crossed between
Angolan, Mozambican, and Zambian borders, highlights the needs for
transboundary conservation.
Zambia’s proposal sought to address issues that are in fact symptoms
of the underlying lack of commitment to solutions for the short- and longterm issues that face African elephants. Employment of the transboundary
conservation model across all CITES parties, along with universal
Appendix I status for African elephants, would help Zambia realize its
goals and positively impact affected parties.

b.

Movement to Expand Legal Ivory Trade

Botswana submitted a proposal at the Conference of the Parties of
CITES in 2019 on behalf of themselves, Namibia, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe, that would have allowed increased quotas for a proposed
future government stockpile sale.152 The original limits permitted the
parties to sell 20,000 kilograms for Botswana, 10,000 kilograms for
Namibia, and 30,000 kilograms for South Africa.153 Botswana’s proposal
would have permitted a future sale of 100,000 kilograms for Botswana,
30,000 kilograms for Namibia, 57,717 kilograms for South Africa, and
120,889 kilograms for Zimbabwe.154 Botswana’s proposal further reduced
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the time between proposals of single government registered ivory sales
from nine to six years from the last proposal.155
Botswana cited the burden of increased elephant populations on local
communities, fragile ecosystems, and the burden of government
compensation for communities affected by human-elephant conflict, as the
reasons for the proposal.156 Among the parties in opposition were Gabon,
which noted even a controlled ivory trade has negative impacts on elephant
populations, and Kenya, which noted the previous singe sale of
government registered ivory resulted in an increase in ivory poaching and
laundering.157 The parties voted to reject Botswana’s proposal.158
Botswana’s proposal symbolized the issues of the legal trade in ivory
along every sequence of the chain; from the nature of ivory itself, to the
countries that seek to trade it being inherently ill-equipped, along with the
historical roots of poor governance and corruption today. Paradoxically,
the proponents represent the countries with the most to lose if a legal sale
were to occur.

i. Why the Legal Ivory Trade Will Never Work
The nature of ivory itself doomed any chance of a viable legal trade
from the beginning, in part because ivory itself is a luxury item mainly
sought after in countries where rapid swaths of the population are gaining
disposable income at increased rates that enables more people to buy more
ivory as those economies grow.159 Ivory’s demand far exceeds elephant’s
ability to supply it, with elephants being one of the slowest reproducing of
all mammal species, there is a large incentive for poachers.160
The path that ivory takes to its buyers is full of the number one factor
associated with high poaching rates: poor governance and corruption,
which enables centers of the illegal ivory trade to grow through increased
operation of organized crime.161 Vietnam is the largest destination country
for illegal ivory; Vietnamese criminal syndicates are known to operate in
Angola, Congo, Mozambique, South Africa, and Togo.162 Countries with
155
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large elephant populations such as Zimbabwe host corruption rankings of
160 out of 180 countries.163 The Central African countries are starkly
emblematic of the correlation, with the Central African Republic ranked
149, Congo: 165, Gabon: 124, and the Democratic Republic of Congo:
161.164 Higher vegetation cover reduces chances of detection by law
enforcement and enables increased poaching opportunities that may
explain why forest elephants are poached at rates significantly higher than
savannah elephants.165 Examples of corruption include wildlife officials
accepting bribes to alter CITES documentation, ignored poaching, and
falsification of certificates.166 Vietnam reports that up to forty-five percent
of wildlife outlets contain a corruption presence.167 Many stocks of ivory
are also owned privately, with owners that speculate a crash in elephant
populations would enable them great profits from sales of their ivory
caches at a premium.168 The path ivory takes from source to destination is
perfectly situated to accommodate the illegal activities required for its sale.
Why is corruption so pervasive across many of the countries involved
in poaching and the illegal ivory trade? The corruption and ineffective
governance present today is in large part due to the historical exploitation
of Africa by colonial powers. The scramble for Africa that began in the
nineteenth century witnessed European exploitation of the continent’s
resources at the expense of the native population.169 Subjugation of Africa
continued until after World War II, when colonial rulers decided that the
end of their empires had come.170 Decolonization was commonly a violent
and haphazard process; nearly all the countries had their boundaries drawn
for the convenience of their rulers that ignored tribal mixtures bound to
fail.171 In 1948, the British government projected full decolonization
would not take place until 1975, but violence erupted in Cote d’Ivoire that
prompted the imperial governments to expedite independence for
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Uganda.172
The different European colonial governments’ displacement of social and
economic orders made the chances of national unity around their systems
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lack appeal, their governments had been in place for less than many of
their subject’s lifetimes.173
This history of the corruption that facilitates the illegal ivory trades is
a part of the foundation of the greater poor governance that exists today in
Africa. If the parties that possess elephants can recognize the futility of the
ivory trade in the long- term as a means of economic stimulus, they can
embrace a more sustainable economic and cultural benefit: the value of the
species alive. Western countries’ investment in the preservation of African
wildlife contrasts their own lack of comparable diversity in wildlife, in
large part due to their own historical role in their wildlife’s decimation.

ii. The Last Elephant Stronghold: Southern Africa
Southern Africa is the last major stronghold of African elephants. The
elephant conservation choices the regions’ respective governments make
have the largest impact on the future of the continental population. With
elephant populations in West and Central Africa decimated by poaching,
and East Africa recently benefited from improved enforcement, Southern
Africa’s seventy percent of the continental elephant population is at dire
risk.174 MIKE data shows Southern Africa’s PIKE score increased 2016 to
2017.175 Of the nearly 294,000 elephants in Southern Africa, about 75%
are found in the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area
shared between Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.176
Southern Africa also contains nearly forty-two percent of the range area
of the species, spanning over 1.3 million square kilometers.177 Despite
recorded increases in the available elephant range in Southern Africa since
2007, the population has declined by 30,000.178 The data suggests the
emergence of a growing poaching threat in Southern Africa includes the
populations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.179
Botswana’s proposal to expand the legal ivory trade for themselves,
Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, would be the beginning of the end
for the last elephant stronghold on the continent. A larger more frequent
legal trade would undoubtedly expand poaching and the illegal trade in the
region.
Botswana contains the most elephants of any country in the world with
about 132,000 or nearly twenty-five percent of the global African elephant
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population.180 Historically safe from the threat of poaching, Botswana has
begun to emerge as a source of illegal ivory.181 A 593% increase in fresh
elephant carcasses between 2014 and 2018 suggested that ivory poached
from hundreds of elephants had recently occurred in northern Botswana.182
Namibia has 23,000 elephants and is a source country for illegally
processed ivory with seventy-five kilograms seized between 2015 and
2017.183 South Africa contains nearly 19,000 elephants, and has emerged
as a major consolidation point for export of illegal ivory smuggled from
individuals poached in nearby Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, and
Zimbabwe.184 South Africa is a significant source of both raw ivory – one
2017 seizure totaled 2,478 kilograms – and illegally processed ivory, with
364 kilograms seized in 2017.185 A significant presence of criminal
activity that includes a substantial presence of Vietnamese organized
crime plays a large role in the operation of the illegal market in South
Africa.186 Zimbabwe contains nearly 83,000 elephants, and was ranked
amongst the top three countries most affected by poaching in Southern
Africa in the AESR 2016.187 Zimbabwe emerged as a country affected by
the illegal ivory trade for the first time in the 2018 ETIS report, and was
cited as a source of raw ivory with 3,552 kilograms seized in 2017.188
Zimbabwe is also one of the two most important countries of origin or
export of illegally processed ivory; combined with Angola, they occupy
thirty-eight percent of the global market.189
Increased legal sales of government ivory stockpiles poses an
enormous threat to the elephants of Southern Arica as the largest regional
population on the continent. The double-edged sword of the situation is
that while the proponents of Botswana’s proposal seek to gain financially
in the short- term, they would do so at the expense of their long- term
potential. Placement of all African elephants on Appendix I would ban the
legal trade and affect a significant decrease in poaching and the illegal
trade.
180
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Proposal to Extend Appendix I Universally

In a change of theme, Gabon submitted a proposal on behalf of
themselves, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria,
Sudan, Syria, and Togo, that would transfer the elephant populations of
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe to Appendix I. In
Gabon’s proposal, the proponents cite three criteria from Conf. 9.24 in
support: 1) a marked decline in the wild population, either as ongoing and
expected to continue, or projected based on levels of exploitation, 2) splitlisting of species should generally be avoided because of the enforcement
problems created, 3) and “in case[s] of uncertainty . . . act in the best
interest of the conservation of the species.”190 Gabon cited a sixty-eight
percent decline in the total African elephant population recorded over a
three-generation period (seventy-five years) as satisfying the criteria for
Appendix I.191
Proponents of Gabon’s proposal highlighted: the widespread illegal
killing of elephants and ivory smuggling throughout the continent, the high
likelihood that estimates are below actual figures, the collapse in global
ivory markets that followed the 1989 decision to move all African elephant
populations to Appendix I, and the positive correlation between the 2008
sale of government registered ivory and the subsequent dramatic increase
in poaching and illegal ivory trade.192
Botswana’s response to Gabon’s proposal was a perfect example of
the deficiency in CITES’ structure. Botswana threatened their Article
XXIII right of the Convention that would have allowed them to exercise a
reservation that removed their elephant population from CITES
regulation.193 In spite of the proponents of Gabon’s proposal citing that the
continent’s population of elephants should be in Appendix I, based on
language in the CITES agreement, Botswana essentially vetoed the
strongest amendment to the parties’ elephant policy in favor of their own
self-interest. In an effort to assuage Botswana, thereby retaining the
country with the most elephants in the world in CITES’ elephant trade
management, the parties rejected Gabon’s proposal.194 Examples such as
Gabon’s proposal highlight the management challenges of a
transboundary species within a system that permits one party to undermine
policy reflective of CITES’ aim to not allow trade to jeopardize the
survival of endangered species.
190

See Prop 11, supra note 146, at 12.
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Summary record of the eleventh session of committee I, at 1, 2, CoP18 Com I. Rec. 11, 3
(2019).
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While Zambia and Botswana’s proposals were symptoms of the
underlying issues facing African elephants, Gabon’s proposal served as a
sign of hope for the future of elephant conservation in CITES. China, the
former lead global destination of illegal ivory, only second to Vietnam
today, voted to move all African elephant populations to Appendix I.
China’s vote along with their closure of domestic ivory markets should
signal other countries that a refusal to transfer all African elephants to
Appendix I will continue the poaching and illegal trade that pose the
greatest short-term threat to their survival.

V. CONCLUSION
Proposals to modify CITES’ elephant policy will continue to be
brought in various forms at each Conference of the Parties until the
underlying issues they mask are addressed. CITES’ aim to not allow the
trade in a species to threaten its survival will remain impossible without a
total ban on the legal trade in ivory for time immemorial, and greater
adoption of transboundary conservation into CITES organizational
structure for elephants throughout Africa. Conceitedly, the vast
complexity that accompanies an overhaul of CITES’ African elephant
management cannot be outlined in a single article; however, the first step
is to recognize the threats to the survival of African elephants and identify
solutions. Parties that supported Gabon’s proposal may represent a
brighter future for African elephants. CITES has the choice to proceed
along its current route towards African elephant’s inevitable extinction; or
adjust course towards a future where our grandchildren can still see
elephants throughout Africa. The African elephant can be saved if their
short- and long-term threats are properly addressed. While the forests of
Knysna may never again play host to trumpets of days past, their kin across
the continent can still be afforded the opportunity in the future.

